Venezuela’s modern economy is overwhelmingly dependent on oil exports, with crude petroleum representing more than $4 billion in export value in 2025. Its top trading partners include the United States, China, Spain, Brazil, Turkey, and others that rely on Venezuelan oil, petroleum coke, fertilizers, and metals.
A sudden geopolitical shock such as the capture of Nicolás Maduro by the United States, occurring against the backdrop of instability like the January 2026 explosions in Caracas will trigger the most significant economic realignment in Venezuela in decades. The event will likely:
- Collapse the existing power structure
- Trigger rapid renegotiation of sanctions
- Open the door to Western investment
- Reshape oil production and export flows
- Rebuild diplomatic ties with Western economies
- Shift Venezuela’s trade balance and partner hierarchy
How Maduro’s Capture Will Reshape Venezuela’s Economy
Immediate Economic Effects
- Sanctions relief becomes possible, especially from the U.S., currently Venezuela’s largest export destination.
- Oil production would surge as Western companies re‑enter the market.
- Hyperinflation could stabilize if a transitional government adopts orthodox monetary policy.
- Foreign reserves increase as oil revenues normalize.
International Trade Effects
- Countries that avoided Venezuelan oil due to sanctions (e.g., EU members) would re‑enter the market.
- China and Russia would lose preferential access to discounted Venezuelan crude.
- Latin American neighbors would see increased energy cooperation.
- The U.S. would likely become the dominant buyer of Venezuelan oil again.
Venezuela’s Top 25 Trading Partners and How Nicolás Maduro removal will affect them
1. United States
Current Trade Relationship
The United States has long been Venezuela’s most important economic partner, particularly in the energy sector. For decades, Venezuelan heavy crude flowed directly into U.S. Gulf Coast refineries, which are uniquely engineered to process the dense, sulfur‑rich oil that Venezuela produces. Even during periods of political tension, the U.S. remained a major importer of Venezuelan petroleum coke, scrap metals, and residual fuel oils. Venezuela, in turn, has relied heavily on U.S. exports of refined fuels, industrial machinery, agricultural products, medical equipment, and chemicals inputs essential to maintaining its domestic economy. Despite sanctions, Chevron maintained limited operations under special licenses, underscoring the structural interdependence between the two economies.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
The U.S.–Venezuela relationship has always been shaped by energy security, geography, and ideology. Washington views Venezuela as a critical component of Western Hemisphere stability and a strategic counterweight to extra‑regional powers like China, Russia, and Iran. Under Maduro, relations deteriorated sharply as Venezuela aligned itself with anti‑U.S. blocs, expelled American diplomats, and deepened military and financial ties with U.S. adversaries. Yet even at the height of tensions, American policymakers recognized that Venezuela’s collapse created regional instability fueling migration, organized crime, and humanitarian crises. The U.S. has consistently signaled that political change in Caracas would unlock economic normalization.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
Maduro’s capture instantly reset the bilateral relationship. Sanctions relief would be fast‑tracked, U.S. refiners would resume large‑scale imports of Venezuelan crude, and American oil companies would gain priority access to upstream and midstream investment opportunities. Washington will likely play a central role in stabilizing Venezuela’s institutions, restructuring its debt, and rebuilding PDVSA’s operational capacity. The U.S. would become Venezuela’s dominant trading partner once again, shaping the country’s economic recovery and re‑anchoring it firmly within the Western economic sphere.
2. China
Current Trade Relationship
China is Venezuela’s second‑largest trading partner and has been a major buyer of Venezuelan crude, petroleum derivatives, and chemical products. Much of this trade has been structured through long‑term debt‑for‑oil agreements, where Venezuela repays Chinese loans with discounted barrels. China also exports a wide range of goods to Venezuela, including electronics, industrial machinery, vehicles, telecommunications equipment, and consumer products. Chinese companies have invested in Venezuelan mining, energy infrastructure, and surveillance technology, embedding themselves deeply in the country’s economic architecture.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
China’s interest in Venezuela is both economic and geopolitical. Economically, Venezuela offered China a reliable if heavily discounted source of crude oil to fuel its industrial expansion. Geopolitically, Venezuela served as a foothold for China in the Western Hemisphere, allowing Beijing to challenge U.S. influence in Latin America. Under Maduro, China gained privileged access to natural resources, infrastructure contracts, and strategic sectors. Beijing also provided diplomatic cover for Maduro in international forums, framing Venezuela’s crisis as a sovereignty issue rather than a governance failure.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
Maduro’s capture will significantly weaken China’s position. A U.S.-aligned transitional government would likely renegotiate or cancel debt‑for‑oil agreements, reducing China’s leverage and eliminating the steep discounts it enjoyed. Chinese companies could face audits, contract reviews, or even nationalization of politically sensitive assets. While China would remain an important trading partner, its influence would diminish sharply as Venezuela reorients toward Western markets, regulatory frameworks, and investment standards.
3. Spain
Current Trade Relationship
Spain is one of Venezuela’s most important European trading partners, importing significant volumes of crude petroleum, petroleum coke, and chemical derivatives. Spanish energy giant Repsol has maintained joint ventures in Venezuela for decades, even during periods of sanctions and political instability. Spain also exports pharmaceuticals, industrial machinery, food products, and consumer goods to Venezuela, supported by strong commercial ties and a large Venezuelan diaspora community residing in Spain.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
Spain’s relationship with Venezuela is shaped by historical, cultural, and economic ties. As a former colonial power with deep linguistic and familial connections, Spain has long played a mediating role in EU‑Latin America relations. Politically, Spain has balanced criticism of Maduro’s authoritarianism with pragmatic engagement to protect its corporate interests. Repsol’s continued presence in Venezuela reflects Spain’s long‑term strategic interest in maintaining access to Latin American energy markets and ensuring stability in a region with strong cultural ties to Europe.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
The post‑Maduro transition would allow Spain to expand its energy footprint significantly. Repsol would be able to increase production, repatriate profits, and participate in new upstream and downstream projects without the constraints of sanctions. Spain would also benefit from renewed Venezuelan demand for European pharmaceuticals, machinery, and food products. Politically, Spain would likely play a key role in EU‑led stabilization efforts, positioning itself as a bridge between Venezuela and Western institutions.
4. Brazil
Current Trade Relationship
Brazil imports Venezuelan fertilizers, petroleum coke, scrap metals, and chemical inputs, while exporting food products, agricultural machinery, chemicals, and manufactured goods. The two countries share a long land border, making cross‑border trade formal and informal a major component of their economic relationship. Brazil has also relied on Venezuelan energy cooperation in the Amazon region, including electricity exchanges and fuel supply agreements.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
Brazil’s relationship with Venezuela has fluctuated depending on the political orientation of each country’s leadership. Under left‑leaning governments, Brazil pursued deeper integration with Venezuela through Mercosur and regional development initiatives. Under right‑leaning governments, relations cooled, and Brazil took a harder stance against Maduro’s authoritarianism. Regardless of ideology, Brazil has always prioritized border stability, migration management, and energy cooperation, given the humanitarian and security challenges created by Venezuela’s collapse.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
Maduro’s removal dramatically improves Brazil‑Venezuela relations. Border trade would normalize, smuggling would decline, and energy cooperation could be restored. Brazil would gain access to more stable supplies of fertilizers and petrochemical inputs, supporting its massive agricultural sector. Politically, Brazil would welcome a more predictable and democratic neighbor, reducing regional instability and strengthening South American economic integration.
5. Turkey
Current Trade Relationship
Turkey has become a surprising but significant trading partner for Venezuela, particularly in the gold sector. During the height of sanctions, Venezuela exported large quantities of gold to Turkey for refining, while importing Turkish textiles, machinery, household goods, and processed foods. Turkey also imported Venezuelan scrap metals and petroleum derivatives, taking advantage of discounted prices and opaque financial channels.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
Turkey’s relationship with Venezuela expanded rapidly under Maduro due to shared political interests and mutual isolation from Western institutions. Ankara positioned itself as a financial and logistical partner for Venezuela, helping Caracas bypass sanctions through gold refining, offshore banking, and alternative payment systems. Politically, Turkey used the relationship to project influence into Latin America and strengthen ties with anti‑Western governments.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
Maduro’s capture severely weakens Turkey’s position. A U.S.-aligned transitional government would likely shut down gold‑for‑cash channels, audit Turkish‑linked financial networks, and reorient trade toward Western partners. Turkey would lose access to discounted Venezuelan commodities and the political influence it gained during the sanctions era. While some commercial ties would remain, Turkey’s strategic role would diminish sharply.
6. India
Current Trade Relationship
India has historically been one of the largest buyers of Venezuelan heavy crude, particularly during the 2010–2018 period when Venezuelan oil exports to Asia surged. Indian refiners such as Reliance Industries and Nayara Energy relied heavily on Venezuelan crude because it offered a cost‑effective feedstock for their complex refining systems. In return, India exports pharmaceuticals, chemicals, textiles, refined petroleum products, and industrial machinery to Venezuela. Even during sanctions, India remained a quiet but important commercial partner, often purchasing Venezuelan crude through intermediaries or blended shipments.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
India’s interest in Venezuela is primarily economic rather than ideological. As one of the world’s fastest‑growing energy consumers, India seeks diversified and affordable crude supplies. Venezuela’s heavy crude fits well with India’s refinery configurations, making the relationship commercially attractive. Politically, India has maintained a non‑aligned posture, avoiding direct confrontation with the U.S. while still engaging with sanctioned states when economically beneficial. India has also viewed Venezuela as a potential partner in South‑South cooperation, particularly in pharmaceuticals and energy technology.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
Maduro’s capture allows India to resume direct oil purchases without sanctions risk, restoring a major supply channel for its refiners. India would likely seek long‑term crude supply contracts, joint ventures in refining and petrochemicals, and expanded pharmaceutical exports. However, India would face increased competition from U.S. and European companies re‑entering the Venezuelan market. While India would remain an important partner, its relative influence would decline as Venezuela reorients toward Western markets and regulatory frameworks.
7. Netherlands
Current Trade Relationship
The Netherlands plays a crucial role in Venezuelan trade due to the strategic importance of the Port of Rotterdam and the Dutch Caribbean territories (Aruba, Curaçao, Bonaire). These locations have historically served as transshipment hubs for Venezuelan crude, refined products, and petrochemicals. Even during sanctions, some Venezuelan shipments passed through Dutch‑linked ports via intermediaries. The Netherlands exports refined fuels, industrial machinery, chemicals, and maritime services to Venezuela, making it a key logistical and commercial partner.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
The Netherlands’ interest in Venezuela is driven by maritime logistics, energy flows, and regional stability in the Caribbean. Dutch Caribbean territories have deep historical and economic ties to Venezuela, including shared energy infrastructure and labor flows. Politically, the Netherlands has aligned with EU positions condemning Maduro’s authoritarianism while supporting humanitarian aid and democratic transition efforts. The Dutch government has also been concerned about security risks posed by Venezuelan instability, including migration and illicit maritime activity.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
Maduro’s capture allows the Netherlands to fully restore energy transshipment operations and expand maritime services linked to Venezuelan crude. Rotterdam would likely regain its role as a major hub for Venezuelan oil entering Europe. Dutch Caribbean territories would benefit from increased fuel supply stability, tourism flows, and cross‑border commerce. The Netherlands would also play a key role in EU‑led stabilization and reconstruction initiatives, strengthening its strategic position in the Caribbean basin.
8. Italy
Current Trade Relationship
Italy imports Venezuelan petroleum coke, chemical derivatives, and small volumes of crude oil. Italian energy giant ENI has maintained joint ventures in Venezuela’s upstream sector, including natural gas and heavy crude projects. Italy exports industrial machinery, vehicles, pharmaceuticals, and luxury goods to Venezuela. Despite sanctions, ENI has continued limited operations under humanitarian exemptions, reflecting Italy’s long‑term commercial interest in Venezuela’s energy sector.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
Italy’s relationship with Venezuela is shaped by energy security, corporate interests, and a sizable Venezuelan‑Italian diaspora. ENI’s presence in Venezuela reflects Italy’s broader strategy of maintaining diversified energy partnerships across Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Politically, Italy has supported EU sanctions and democratic transition efforts while advocating for humanitarian engagement. Italy has also been concerned about migration flows from Venezuela into Southern Europe.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
The post‑Maduro transition would allow ENI to expand production, repatriate profits, and participate in new upstream and midstream projects. Italy would benefit from increased Venezuelan demand for industrial machinery, pharmaceuticals, and vehicles. Politically, Italy would support EU‑led stabilization efforts and seek to position itself as a key European investor in Venezuela’s reconstruction. Italy’s influence in the Venezuelan energy sector would grow significantly under a stable, Western‑aligned government.
9. Portugal
Current Trade Relationship
Portugal imports Venezuelan petroleum derivatives and exports food products, electronics, machinery, and consumer goods. The relationship is heavily influenced by the large Portuguese‑Venezuelan community, many of whom operate small and medium‑sized businesses in Venezuela. Remittances, family‑owned enterprises, and diaspora‑driven commerce have historically strengthened bilateral trade. Portuguese banks and retailers have maintained a presence in Venezuela despite economic volatility.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
Portugal’s strategic interest in Venezuela is rooted in diaspora ties, commercial networks, and cultural affinity. Politically, Portugal has aligned with EU positions condemning Maduro’s authoritarianism while advocating for humanitarian support and diplomatic engagement. The Portuguese government has also been active in supporting its citizens living in Venezuela during periods of economic collapse and insecurity.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
Maduro’s capture revitalizes Portugal‑Venezuela trade by restoring financial stability, reducing security risks, and enabling diaspora‑driven investment. Portuguese businesses would expand operations in retail, food distribution, and light manufacturing. Portugal would also benefit from increased Venezuelan demand for European machinery, electronics, and food products. The diaspora would play a major role in rebuilding commercial networks and restoring confidence in the Venezuelan market.
10. Colombia
Current Trade Relationship
Colombia is one of Venezuela’s most important neighbors and trading partners, exchanging food products, cement, chemicals, manufactured goods, fertilizers, and scrap metals. The two countries share a long and porous border, making cross‑border trade both formal and informal a major component of their economic relationship. Colombia has also absorbed millions of Venezuelan migrants, creating new economic linkages and labor flows.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
Colombia’s relationship with Venezuela is shaped by geography, security, and migration. The collapse of Venezuela’s economy created massive humanitarian and security challenges for Colombia, including refugee flows, smuggling, and the presence of armed groups operating along the border. Politically, Colombia has been one of the strongest critics of Maduro’s authoritarianism, supporting democratic transition efforts and aligning closely with U.S. policy. Despite tensions, Colombia has always prioritized border stability and economic cooperation.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
Maduro’s removal will dramatically improve Colombia‑Venezuela relations. Border trade would normalize, smuggling would decline, and security cooperation would increase. Colombia would benefit from renewed Venezuelan demand for food products, manufactured goods, and chemicals. Migration pressures would ease as Venezuelans begin returning home or participating in reconstruction efforts. Colombia would emerge as one of the biggest regional beneficiaries of Venezuela’s stabilization.
11. Mexico
Current Trade Relationship
Mexico maintains a balanced and diversified trade relationship with Venezuela, exporting food products, vehicles, industrial machinery, chemicals, and manufactured goods. In return, Mexico imports Venezuelan petroleum coke, fertilizers, and certain petrochemical derivatives. Historically, Pemex and PDVSA cooperated on refining and technical exchanges, though this cooperation diminished as Venezuela’s oil sector collapsed. Despite political fluctuations, commercial ties have persisted through private‑sector channels, particularly in food distribution, automotive parts, and pharmaceuticals.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
Mexico’s approach to Venezuela has been shaped by its doctrine of non‑intervention and its desire to maintain diplomatic neutrality in Latin American conflicts. While Mexico has expressed concern about Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis, it has avoided taking a hardline stance against Maduro, preferring dialogue‑based solutions. Economically, Mexico views Venezuela as a potential market for manufactured goods and a partner in regional energy integration. Politically, Mexico has sought to balance relations with both the U.S. and Latin American left‑leaning governments, positioning itself as a mediator rather than an adversary.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
Maduro’s capture allows Mexico to expand commercial ties without the political sensitivities that previously constrained engagement. Mexican exporters would benefit from renewed Venezuelan demand for food products, vehicles, and industrial machinery. Energy cooperation could resume, particularly in refining technology and petrochemical development. Mexico would also gain from reduced migration pressures and improved regional stability. While Mexico would not be the dominant player in Venezuela’s reconstruction, it would quietly strengthen its economic footprint.
12. Argentina
Current Trade Relationship
Argentina imports Venezuelan chemicals, fertilizers, and small volumes of petroleum derivatives, while exporting food products, agricultural machinery, pharmaceuticals, and manufactured goods. Historically, the two countries cooperated through regional blocs such as Mercosur and UNASUR, with trade flows supported by shared agricultural and industrial complementarities. Argentina’s pharmaceutical and agricultural sectors have been particularly active in the Venezuelan market, even during periods of economic instability.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
Argentina’s relationship with Venezuela has shifted depending on the political orientation of its government. Left‑leaning administrations maintained close ties with Maduro, emphasizing ideological solidarity and regional integration through blocs like ALBA and UNASUR. Centrist and right‑leaning governments, however, distanced themselves from Caracas, aligning with international pressure for democratic reforms and condemning human rights abuses. Regardless of ideology, Argentina has consistently viewed Venezuela as a potential market for agricultural exports, pharmaceuticals, and industrial goods. Argentina has also been deeply affected by regional instability caused by Venezuela’s collapse, including migration flows and disruptions to regional supply chains.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
The post‑Maduro transition will allow Argentina to expand agricultural exports, increase pharmaceutical sales, and participate in infrastructure and energy projects. Argentine companies could re‑enter sectors such as food processing, logistics, and agricultural technology, which were previously constrained by Venezuela’s economic collapse. Politically, Argentina would support regional stabilization efforts and seek to strengthen Mercosur’s role in Venezuela’s reintegration into South American economic structures. Argentina would benefit from a more predictable and commercially open Venezuela, improving regional economic cohesion.
13. Germany
Current Trade Relationship
Germany imports Venezuelan chemical derivatives, scrap metals, and small volumes of petroleum products. In return, Germany exports industrial machinery, vehicles, medical equipment, chemicals, and high‑value manufactured goods. German engineering firms have historically participated in Venezuelan infrastructure, energy, and industrial projects, though most withdrew due to sanctions, hyperinflation, and political instability. Germany’s exports to Venezuela have declined sharply but remain strategically important in sectors requiring advanced technology.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
Germany’s interest in Venezuela is driven by its commitment to democratic governance, human rights, and global energy stability. Berlin has been one of the strongest European critics of Maduro’s authoritarianism, supporting sanctions and humanitarian aid initiatives. Economically, Germany views Venezuela as a potential market for industrial machinery, renewable energy technology, and medical equipment. Germany also has strategic concerns about Russian and Chinese influence in Latin America, particularly in energy and telecommunications.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
Maduro’s capture allows German companies to re‑enter the Venezuelan market with reduced political risk. German engineering firms could participate in rebuilding Venezuela’s electricity grid, water systems, industrial plants, and transportation infrastructure. Germany would also expand exports of medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and renewable energy technology. Politically, Germany would support EU‑led stabilization efforts and seek to limit Chinese and Russian influence in Venezuela’s reconstruction.
14. France
Current Trade Relationship
France imports Venezuelan petroleum derivatives, metals, and chemical products, while exporting pharmaceuticals, luxury goods, industrial machinery, and aerospace components. French energy giant TotalEnergies previously held significant upstream investments in Venezuela, though operations were scaled back due to sanctions and political instability. France also maintains cultural and educational ties with Venezuela through Francophone institutions and academic exchanges.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
France’s relationship with Venezuela is shaped by its broader Latin America strategy, which emphasizes democratic governance, human rights, and economic cooperation. Paris has been a vocal critic of Maduro’s authoritarianism while supporting humanitarian aid and diplomatic pressure. Economically, France views Venezuela as a potential partner in energy, infrastructure, and aerospace sectors. France has also been concerned about the expansion of Russian and Chinese influence in the region.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
The post‑Maduro transition will allow TotalEnergies to re‑enter Venezuela’s upstream sector, participate in natural gas development, and expand petrochemical operations. French companies would benefit from increased demand for pharmaceuticals, industrial machinery, and consumer goods. France would also play a leading role in EU‑backed reconstruction initiatives, leveraging its diplomatic influence to shape Venezuela’s reintegration into Western economic systems.
15. United Kingdom
Current Trade Relationship
The United Kingdom imports Venezuelan metals, petroleum derivatives, and chemical products, while exporting financial services, industrial machinery, chemicals, and consumer goods. London has historically been a major center for Venezuelan sovereign debt trading, gold transactions, and international arbitration cases involving PDVSA. British companies have participated in Venezuela’s energy, mining, and financial sectors, though most withdrew due to sanctions and political risk.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
The UK’s interest in Venezuela is driven by financial markets, energy security, and geopolitical alignment with the United States. London has been a strong critic of Maduro’s authoritarianism and has supported sanctions, democratic transition efforts, and humanitarian aid. The UK has also played a central role in legal disputes over Venezuelan gold reserves held in the Bank of England, reflecting its broader involvement in Venezuela’s financial governance.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
Maduro’s capture will allow the UK to normalize financial relations with Venezuela, resolve outstanding arbitration cases, and facilitate the return of Venezuelan gold reserves under a legitimate transitional government. British companies could re‑enter the energy, mining, and financial services sectors. The UK would also support reconstruction efforts through development financing, regulatory assistance, and investment promotion. London would regain its role as a major financial hub for Venezuelan transactions.
16. Russia
Current Trade Relationship
Russia has been one of Venezuela’s most politically and economically significant partners during the Maduro era. Venezuela exported discounted crude oil, petroleum derivatives, and mining products to Russia, often through opaque channels designed to bypass sanctions. In return, Russia supplied Venezuela with wheat, industrial machinery, refined fuels, and most notably military equipment. Rosneft played a central role in marketing Venezuelan crude internationally, acting as a lifeline for PDVSA when Western markets closed. Russian advisors, technicians, and financial intermediaries became embedded in Venezuela’s oil, defense, and banking sectors.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
Russia’s interest in Venezuela is deeply geopolitical. Moscow viewed Venezuela as a strategic foothold in the Western Hemisphere a counterweight to NATO expansion and U.S. influence. Venezuela provided Russia with opportunities to project military presence, conduct joint exercises, and challenge Western sanctions regimes. Economically, Russia benefited from discounted Venezuelan crude and access to mining concessions. Politically, Russia supported Maduro in the UN Security Council, provided intelligence assistance, and helped Venezuela circumvent financial restrictions. The relationship was less about trade volume and more about strategic leverage.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
Maduro’s capture will be a major geopolitical loss for Russia. A U.S.-aligned transitional government would likely expel Russian military advisors, cancel opaque oil‑marketing agreements, and review mining concessions. Rosneft’s role in Venezuelan crude distribution would collapse overnight. Russia will lose a key ally in Latin America and a valuable sanctions‑bypass partner. While some commercial ties might survive, Russia’s political influence would shrink dramatically, and its access to Venezuelan resources would be sharply curtailed.
17. Iran
Current Trade Relationship
Iran and Venezuela developed a close economic partnership centered on fuel swaps, refinery repairs, petrochemical cooperation, and industrial support. As Venezuela’s refining system collapsed, Iran supplied gasoline, refinery components, and technical expertise. In return, Venezuela exported gold, petrochemical products, and occasionally crude oil through Iranian‑linked networks. Iran also exported food products, household goods, and industrial equipment to Venezuela, often through state‑linked companies.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
Iran’s relationship with Venezuela is rooted in shared ideological opposition to the United States and mutual isolation from Western financial systems. Both countries used the partnership to circumvent sanctions, exchange technical expertise, and build alternative trade channels. Iran viewed Venezuela as a strategic ally in the Western Hemisphere, providing opportunities to expand influence, test sanctions‑evasion methods, and strengthen ties with anti‑U.S. governments. The partnership also had symbolic value, demonstrating resistance to Western pressure.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
Maduro’s capture will effectively end Iran’s privileged access to Venezuela. A transitional government aligned with the U.S. would shut down Iranian fuel shipments, refinery partnerships, and gold‑for‑cash arrangements. Iranian technicians would be replaced by Western energy companies, and Iranian‑linked financial networks would be dismantled. Iran would lose a rare strategic ally in the Americas, and its influence in Venezuela would collapse almost immediately.
18. United Arab Emirates (UAE)
Current Trade Relationship
The UAE has become a major trading partner for Venezuela, particularly in gold, petroleum derivatives, and financial services. During sanctions, large volumes of Venezuelan gold were exported to Dubai for refining and resale. The UAE also imported petrochemicals and metals while exporting electronics, vehicles, machinery, and luxury goods to Venezuela. Emirati free‑trade zones and financial institutions played a key role in facilitating Venezuelan transactions that could not pass through Western banks.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
The UAE’s interest in Venezuela is primarily commercial. Dubai’s gold market benefited from Venezuelan supply, while Emirati logistics hubs profited from re‑exports and financial services. Politically, the UAE maintained a neutral stance, avoiding overt alignment with Maduro while allowing commercial actors to engage with Venezuelan entities. The UAE’s broader strategy of becoming a global trade and financial hub made Venezuela a useful if risky partner during the sanctions era.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
Maduro’s capture will significantly reduce the UAE’s role in Venezuelan gold and financial flows. A transitional government would likely halt gold exports to Dubai, increase transparency, and reorient trade toward Western markets. However, the UAE could still benefit from legitimate Venezuelan exports of petrochemicals and metals, and Emirati companies could participate in infrastructure, logistics, and aviation projects. The UAE would lose its sanctions‑driven advantages but retain opportunities in a normalized commercial environment.
19. Singapore
Current Trade Relationship
Singapore imports Venezuelan petroleum derivatives, petrochemicals, and metals, while exporting electronics, chemicals, industrial equipment, and financial services. As one of the world’s largest energy trading hubs, Singapore has played a key role in facilitating Venezuelan oil transactions, particularly through intermediaries and commodity traders. Singaporean firms have also participated in shipping, storage, and blending operations involving Venezuelan crude.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
Singapore’s interest in Venezuela is driven by its role as a global logistics and energy hub. The city‑state maintains a neutral foreign policy, allowing it to engage commercially with countries under sanctions while adhering to international regulations. Singaporean commodity traders have historically been involved in Venezuelan crude marketing, often through complex supply chains. Politically, Singapore has avoided taking strong positions on Venezuela, focusing instead on regulatory compliance and commercial opportunity.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
Maduro’s capture will allow Singapore to engage with Venezuela more openly and transparently. Singaporean traders could resume legitimate crude purchases, storage operations, and petrochemical transactions without sanctions risk. Singapore would also benefit from increased Venezuelan demand for electronics, chemicals, and industrial equipment. While Singapore would lose some opaque trading opportunities, it would gain access to a more stable and predictable commercial environment.
20. South Korea
Current Trade Relationship
South Korea imports Venezuelan metals, petrochemicals, and petroleum coke, while exporting vehicles, electronics, industrial machinery, and refined fuels. Korean companies have historically participated in Venezuelan infrastructure, automotive, and energy projects, though most withdrew due to political instability and payment risks. South Korea’s advanced manufacturing sector has long viewed Venezuela as a potential market for high‑value goods.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
South Korea’s interest in Venezuela is primarily economic, driven by its need for industrial inputs and its desire to expand exports to emerging markets. Politically, South Korea has aligned with Western positions condemning Maduro’s authoritarianism while supporting humanitarian aid and democratic transition efforts. South Korea has also been concerned about North Korean activity in Latin America, making Venezuela’s political alignment strategically relevant.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
Maduro’s capture will allow South Korean companies to re‑enter the Venezuelan market with reduced risk. Korean automakers, electronics manufacturers, and industrial firms would benefit from renewed demand for vehicles, appliances, and machinery. South Korea could also participate in rebuilding Venezuela’s telecommunications, transportation, and energy infrastructure. Politically, South Korea would support Western stabilization efforts and seek to limit Chinese influence in Venezuela’s reconstruction.
21. Japan
Current Trade Relationship
Japan imports Venezuelan petroleum coke, metals, and small volumes of crude oil, while exporting vehicles, industrial machinery, electronics, and high‑precision manufacturing equipment. Japanese companies have historically participated in Venezuela’s automotive, energy, and industrial sectors, though most withdrew due to political instability, currency controls, and payment risks. Japan’s advanced manufacturing sector has long viewed Venezuela as a potential market for high‑value goods, particularly in automotive parts, heavy machinery, and electronics.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
Japan’s interest in Venezuela is driven by energy diversification, industrial exports, and geopolitical alignment with Western democracies. Tokyo has consistently supported sanctions against Maduro’s government and has provided humanitarian aid to Venezuelan migrants in Latin America. Japan is also concerned about Chinese and Russian influence in the region, viewing Venezuela as a strategic flashpoint in the broader competition for global influence. Japan’s foreign policy emphasizes stability, rule of law, and predictable investment environments all of which deteriorated under Maduro.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
Maduro’s capture will allow Japan to re‑enter the Venezuelan market with reduced political and financial risk. Japanese automakers, electronics manufacturers, and industrial firms would benefit from renewed demand for vehicles, appliances, and machinery. Japan could also participate in rebuilding Venezuela’s electricity grid, telecommunications networks, and industrial infrastructure. Politically, Japan would support Western stabilization efforts and seek to limit Chinese influence in Venezuela’s reconstruction. Japan’s role would be significant, particularly in high‑technology sectors.
22. Chile
Current Trade Relationship
Chile imports Venezuelan fertilizers, chemicals, and small volumes of petroleum derivatives, while exporting food products, manufactured goods, wine, and industrial inputs. Historically, Chilean companies have participated in Venezuela’s retail, food distribution, and consumer goods sectors. Trade between the two countries has fluctuated due to Venezuela’s economic collapse, but commercial ties have persisted through private‑sector channels.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
Chile’s relationship with Venezuela is shaped by democratic values, regional stability, and economic complementarity. Chile has been one of the strongest critics of Maduro’s authoritarianism, supporting sanctions, democratic transition efforts, and humanitarian aid. Chile has also absorbed a significant number of Venezuelan migrants, creating new economic and social linkages. Economically, Chile views Venezuela as a potential market for food products, manufactured goods, and services.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
Maduro’s capture will allow Chile to expand exports of food products, beverages, manufactured goods, and industrial inputs. Chilean retailers and logistics companies could re‑enter the Venezuelan market, taking advantage of renewed consumer demand. Politically, Chile would support regional stabilization efforts and seek to strengthen democratic institutions in Venezuela. Chile would benefit from reduced migration pressures and improved regional security.
23. Peru
Current Trade Relationship
Peru imports Venezuelan fertilizers, chemicals, and petrochemical derivatives, while exporting food products, textiles, manufactured goods, and industrial inputs. Trade between the two countries has historically been modest but stable, supported by regional integration frameworks and complementary economic structures. Peruvian companies have participated in Venezuela’s food distribution, textile, and consumer goods sectors.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
Peru’s relationship with Venezuela is shaped by democratic governance, regional stability, and economic cooperation. Peru has been a vocal critic of Maduro’s authoritarianism and has played a leading role in the Lima Group, which sought democratic transition in Venezuela. Peru has also absorbed a large number of Venezuelan migrants, creating new economic and social linkages. Economically, Peru views Venezuela as a potential market for food products, textiles, and manufactured goods.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
Maduro’s capture will allow Peru to expand exports of food products, textiles, and manufactured goods. Peruvian companies could re‑enter the Venezuelan market with reduced risk, particularly in retail, logistics, and consumer goods. Politically, Peru would support regional stabilization efforts and seek to strengthen democratic institutions in Venezuela. Peru would benefit from reduced migration pressures and improved regional security.
24. Ecuador
Current Trade Relationship
Ecuador imports Venezuelan fertilizers, petroleum derivatives, and chemical products, while exporting food products, agricultural goods, chemicals, and manufactured items. Historically, the two countries have cooperated through regional blocs such as ALBA and UNASUR, though economic ties weakened as Venezuela’s economy collapsed. Cross‑border trade has been limited but persistent, supported by private‑sector networks and agricultural complementarities.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
Ecuador’s relationship with Venezuela has shifted depending on the political orientation of its government. Left‑leaning administrations maintained close ties with Maduro, while centrist and right‑leaning governments distanced themselves and aligned with democratic transition efforts. Regardless of ideology, Ecuador has always viewed Venezuela as a potential market for agricultural exports and manufactured goods. Ecuador has also been affected by migration flows from Venezuela.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
Maduro’s capture will allow Ecuador to expand agricultural exports, increase manufactured goods sales, and participate in regional energy and infrastructure projects. Ecuadorian companies could re‑enter the Venezuelan market with reduced risk, particularly in food distribution, chemicals, and light manufacturing. Politically, Ecuador would support regional stabilization efforts and seek to strengthen economic integration. Ecuador would benefit from reduced migration pressures and improved regional security.
25. Dominican Republic
Current Trade Relationship
The Dominican Republic imports Venezuelan petroleum derivatives, petrochemicals, and metals, while exporting food products, manufactured goods, textiles, and tourism services. Historically, the Dominican Republic benefited from Venezuela’s Petrocaribe program, which provided discounted oil in exchange for long‑term financing. Trade between the two countries has declined due to Venezuela’s economic collapse but remains strategically important for energy and food supply chains.
Strategic Interests & Political Alignment
The Dominican Republic’s interest in Venezuela is driven by energy security, regional stability, and economic cooperation. The country has maintained a pragmatic stance toward Venezuela, balancing criticism of Maduro’s authoritarianism with the need to maintain energy supply channels. The Dominican Republic has also absorbed Venezuelan migrants, creating new economic and social linkages. Economically, it views Venezuela as a potential partner in energy, tourism, and food distribution.
Impact of Maduro’s Capture
Maduro’s capture will allow the Dominican Republic to revive energy cooperation, potentially restoring a modernized version of Petrocaribe under transparent, market‑based terms. Dominican exporters would benefit from renewed Venezuelan demand for food products, manufactured goods, and textiles. Tourism flows could increase as Venezuela stabilizes. Politically, the Dominican Republic would support regional stabilization efforts and seek to strengthen Caribbean‑South American economic integration.
The Big Winners: The United States and Western Energy Markets
Maduro being captured amid internal instability like the Caracas explosions, the United States becomes the primary geopolitical winner. Washington gains immediate strategic leverage: sanctions relief becomes viable, U.S. refiners regain access to Venezuelan heavy crude, and American policymakers can reshape hemispheric energy security. The crisis reinforces the long‑standing U.S. argument that Venezuela’s instability threatens regional security and global oil markets. With Maduro removed, the U.S. is positioned to stabilize the country, secure long‑term production agreements, and reassert influence in the Caribbean basin.
Europe and Latin American Neighbors
European nations especially Spain, Italy, Portugal, and the Netherlands benefit from a stabilized Venezuela emerging from the chaos of Maduro. Their energy companies have been constrained by sanctions and political volatility; a transition government would allow them to expand upstream operations and diversify supply away from Russia. Latin American neighbors such as Brazil and Colombia would also gain from reduced border tensions, revived electricity‑sharing agreements, and normalized migration flows. The explosions in Caracas underscore how urgently the region needs a stable Venezuela to restore economic and security cooperation.
Multilateral Institutions and Global Commodity Markets
Institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and Inter‑American Development Bank will gain influence as Venezuela re‑enters formal financial channels. A country emerging from violence and political crisis will require stabilization funds, debt restructuring, and infrastructure rebuilding. Global commodity markets would also benefit: Venezuelan crude returning to the market would ease supply tightness, reduce price volatility, and create new hedging opportunities. Petrochemical, fertilizer, and metals markets would stabilize as exports normalize, reversing years of erratic production caused by political turmoil.
The Big Losers: China, Russia, Iran, and Turkey
The geopolitical bloc that supported Maduro loses the most. China will lose preferential access to discounted crude and the ability to structure debt‑for‑oil deals. Russia will lose a key ally in the Western Hemisphere and a valuable sanctions‑bypass partner. Iran will lose a refinery‑swap partner and a foothold for fuel shipments. Turkey would lose access to Venezuelan gold flows and financial channels that expanded during sanctions. Now that Maduro is removed these countries lose both influence and access to Venezuela’s strategic resources.
The Big Losers: Illicit Networks, Sanctions‑Driven Middlemen, and Shadow Markets
Venezuela’s economy has been shaped by informal networks, Maduro’s removal will dismantle the ecosystem of intermediaries, smugglers, and opaque financial channels that thrived under sanctions. Shadow oil traders, gold refiners, and offshore brokers would lose access to arbitrage opportunities created by Venezuela’s isolation. Smuggling networks along the Colombian and Brazilian borders will shrink as formal trade routes reopen. Maritime operators involved in ship‑to‑ship transfers, AIS spoofing, and dark‑fleet logistics would see their business evaporate. Transparency replaces opacity, eliminating the premium extracted by these actors.
Venezuela’s Fastest Economic Recovery in Decades Driven by American Oil Companies
With Maduro removed and the instability beginning to subside, Venezuela will be positioned for its fastest economic recovery in decades. American oil companies especially Chevron and other Gulf Coast refiners would rapidly scale production through joint ventures, technology upgrades, and capital injections into PDVSA’s collapsed infrastructure. Sanctions relief would allow Venezuela to double or even triple output within five years, restoring government revenue, stabilizing the bolívar, and reviving domestic employment. U.S. firms would bring modern safety standards, transparent accounting, and operational efficiency, transforming Venezuela’s oil sector from a failing state asset into a globally competitive producer. For the first time in a generation, Venezuela will have a credible path back to macroeconomic stability.