Author: Maria Pechurina, Director of International Trade
It is Tuesday, November 4th, and the 100% tariff on China we so feared (did we, though, after so many empty threats?) is nowhere to be seen. The internet is exploding with images of President Trump decked out in CCP gear and saluting Chairman Xi, with the recent U.S.–China trade deal being crowned as a major win for Beijing.
Chinese netizens repeatedly call Trump 川建国, or the builder of China, because the concessions are that one-sided. From the U.S. agreement to postpone implementation of the BIS 50% Affiliates Rule for another year, to resuming semiconductor flows and suspending higher tariffs altogether, the U.S. appears to be playing into China’s “biding time” strategy as Beijing continues to push toward technological autonomy, leadership in green tech and EVs, and a stronger diplomatic position while the U.S. chips away at its own hegemony.
This deal is already evidence of sacrificing economic gains for political optics, mainly on the U.S. side, and it highlights a growing weakness in U.S. leverage. Critics argue that the concessions have far exceeded China’s, revealing an uncomfortable truth: they need us less than we need them.
Eyes on Beijing
China’s concessions began with the suspension of all retaliatory tariffs and non-tariff measures against the U.S. , and there were many. These included 15% on U.S. chicken, wheat, corn, and cotton, and 10% on a range of agricultural products such as soybeans, pork, and beef. China also promised to remove export controls announced in October 2025, while keeping earlier controls (from April 2025) on rare earths like gallium, germanium, antimony, and graphite, minerals crucial to U.S. defense and technology sectors.
The announcement of these rare-earth controls sent shockwaves through global markets but was largely political, timed perfectly ahead of the Fourth Plenum when China vowed to become technologically autonomous within five years. Unsurprisingly, these potentially damaging measures were among the first to go, though it’s unclear whether Beijing ever intended to enforce them fully.
A major headline item is China’s resumption of agricultural imports, including 12 million metric tons of soybeans in 2025 and a commitment to purchase 25 MMT annually through 2028. Historically, China has purchased more than half of total U.S. soybean exports, worth about $12.6 billion per year. That means China effectively props up a significant share of the U.S. agricultural economy, leaving American farmers exposed when those purchases stop.
The events of May 2025 proved that U.S. producers are easily replaceable. When China halted U.S. purchases, it quickly turned to Argentina and Brazil. The sheer size of China’s buyer market allows it to dictate prices, and this volatility often leaves American farmers with unsellable crops. In short, export growth alone can’t guarantee food or economic security for the U.S.
The deportation of 1.2 million foreign nationals, at least a quarter of whom worked in agriculture, could further damage domestic food production, not to mention export capacity. Agriculture has always suffered disproportionately from tariffs and trade disruptions. A good example came in 2021, when China banned imports of Taiwanese pineapples under the pretense of biosecurity concerns but in reality to apply political pressure. As the buyer of 90% of Taiwan’s pineapple exports, China was able to cripple the industry right before harvest season, causing widespread losses.
The takeaway is simple: agriculture is a low-hanging fruit for China’s power displays. It’s labor-intensive, time-sensitive, and politically vulnerable, meaning large shifts in Chinese demand can cause real pain at home.
China also agreed to end investigations targeting U.S. semiconductor companies and to restore operations at Nexperia, a Dutch semiconductor manufacturer critical to the automotive sector. Nexperia’s embedded role and high production volume make it difficult to replace.
The company’s ownership has been a flashpoint for years. In 2019, Chinese tech firm Wingtech became Nexperia’s majority shareholder, prompting the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) to add it to its Entity List. In September 2025, Wingtech was flagged under the BIS 50% Affiliates Rule, which led the Dutch government to reclaim control of Nexperia. To complicate things further, in early October China banned exports of Chinese-manufactured Nexperia components, turning the company into a bargaining chip during the October 30 negotiations.
Finally, China once again pledged to crack down on the export of fentanyl precursors to the U.S. The plan includes inter-agency cooperation, digital tracking of production and shipments, and tighter mail monitoring. Combined with U.S. efforts to monitor low-value shipments and increase CBP staffing, this round could prove more effective than earlier attempts in 2019 and 2023.
U.S. Concessions: Explained
Under the new framework, the United States will reduce tariffs on Chinese goods by 10 percentage points, effective November 10, 2025, bringing the total effective rate to 47% (34% reciprocal tariff + 10% IEEPA fentanyl tariff reduction + 3% historical average tariffs).
The 34% reciprocal tariff was reduced from 24% to 10% under a May 2025 executive order, pausing full implementation through November 10, 2025. That means the current effective tariff rate is about 20%, which is what importers are paying today.
None of this has appeared in the Federal Register yet, and with CBP understaffed and government salaries delayed amid the ongoing shutdown, implementation remains uncertain. The 20% rate is expected to stay in place through November 2026, assuming the deal holds.
Additional measures include:
- Extension of certain Section 301 tariff exclusions through November 2026
- Pause on End-User Control expansions for one year
- Suspension of port fees for Chinese-owned and operated vessels docking at U.S. ports, effective October 14, in exchange for China lifting retaliatory sanctions on U.S. shipping entities
Short- and Long-Term Implications
According to the Executive Order issued November 1, the administration claims this agreement will safeguard U.S. economic strength and national security while prioritizing American workers, farmers, and families.
Yet the loss of $2.5 billion in soybean exports last year continues to ripple through rural communities, especially in Iowa, where agriculture remains central to local economies.
For U.S. businesses, the deal offers little relief or clarity, particularly around technology transfers and investment rules. China hasn’t made meaningful changes, only rolled back retaliatory measures that shouldn’t have existed in the first place. In many ways, this feels like a reset disguised as progress: a lot of noise, very little movement.
The most critical sticking points, like the enforcement of the 50% Affiliates Rule and monitoring of fentanyl precursor exports, remain unresolved. Still, there’s a sense that the U.S. can finally pause, regroup, and reconsider what economic strength should look like in 2025 and beyond. Perhaps this will inspire a more grounded industrial strategy that balances reshoring with realistic labor capacity, without trying to resurrect a mid-century model of mass factory employment under the banner of the “American Dream.”
The Bigger Picture
At minimum, the Trump–Xi meeting , the first in-person exchange since 2019 , marks a breakthrough after years of escalating tensions. The fact that both leaders completed a full discussion without incident, and that Trump’s Asia tour ended without new flare-ups, is in itself a win for global trade stability.
In short, it’s progress, largely symbolic and imperfect, but progress nonetheless.